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In an era of both downsizing of Defense Budgets 
combined with high operational tempo, the military is faced 
with doing more with less as a way of life.  Add to this 
the overall rise in the average age of the ground tactical 
and ground support equipment, and both preventative and 
corrective maintenance takes on added importance.  
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environments that quickly degrade its gear.  While mandated 
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transportation, in use by IMEF appears to be inefficient.  
The objective of this thesis research was to analyze the 
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for the West coast and see if gives the Corps the Best 
Value available.  Best Value in this case considers both 
the effect on equipment readiness and overall cost.  The 
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Maintenance of the Marine Corps tactical ground, and 
ground support equipment, is a constant challenge in an era 
of downsizing of personnel and ever decreasing budget 
constraints.  These factors, combined with the overall 
average rise in age of this equipment, have made it 
imperative that the Corps continues to seek out and 
implement new supply and maintenance programs, which give 
the best overall value to our Marines.  Military 
logisticians in all branches of the Services are faced with 
this same dilemma.  They must continually reinvent their 
business practices and overall doctrinal philosophies in a 
constant search for greater efficiency.  
Many traditional “in-house” programs are put in to 
competition against private sector initiatives, and if 
certain minimum criteria are met, many programs are quickly 
outsourced.  This competition for business between military 
organizations and the private sector is based on numerous 
factors, not only in terms of overall price, but also in 
terms of efficiency, which can be measured by length of 
repair cycle time.  The quicker the turnaround of an item, 
the faster it can be returned to the war fighter to as an 
integral tool to accomplishment their mission.  Depot level 
programs are not immune to this comparison and competition.  
Neither are the current Corrosion Prevention and Control 
Programs (CPAC) being run at Marine Corps Logistics Bases 
in Albany and Barstow.   
This thesis analyzes the current CPAC Programs, and 
determines if there are viable options, which could improve 
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readiness levels to the Operating Forces and decrease costs 
at the same time.  It also takes into consideration the 
transportation of this equipment to and from the Depot as 
part of the overall process (for comparison purposes only).  
This thesis deals solely with tactical ground and ground 
support equipment and does not deal with aviation assets.  
It is limited in scope to the equipment of the I Marine 
Expeditionary Force (IMEF). 
A. OBJECTIVES OF THIS RESEARCH 
The objective of this research is to determine the 
best value available to the Marine Corps Operating Forces 
to accomplish Depot level Corrosion Prevention and Control 
requirements.  Can the current process be improved, is 
there a viable commercial alternative or is the present 
program the best value?  A productive high quality program 
of both preventative and corrective maintenance is 
imperative to the preservation of the ground equipment.  
This overall program continues to take on additional 
importance as our ground assets have consistently seen 
their service life extended - due to budget shortfalls for 
procuring new replacement equipment.  The restoration of 
tactical and support ground equipment to full operational 
status is essential to enabling these assets to meet their 
mission requirements.  This thesis is intended to help in 
deciding if replacement or augmentation of the current 
program is a viable option.   
B. SCOPE 
This thesis analyzes the need for the Depot level CPAC 
program, and why this requirement is essential in extending 
the service life of these pieces of equipment.  It shows 
how the Marine Corps equipment is particularly susceptible 
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to corrosion and moisture intrusion damage based on the 
geographic locations and environments in which they 
operate.  In addition, numerous deployments at sea, and 
storage in open-air storage environments, only add to this 
problem.  As a result, a preventative maintenance program 
in this area is both sound and an essential maintenance 
policy.   
It gives a background on why the Depot level program 
was installed; discusses how it has progressed through the 
years, and where it is currently headed.  It shows the 
breakdown of the different echelons of maintenance 
currently utilized by the Marine Corps, and how each 
handles corrosion inhibition challenges at their level.  
This goes from the Battalion maintainer level up to the 
Depot level.  It examines the current process flow and 
organizational structure utilized by the Depot, and 
analyzes what methods have been implemented for the 
transportation of this equipment both to and from the Depot 
and how this effects the total time the equipment is away 
from the war fighter.  Finally, it analyzes the cost to the 
Marine Corps in terms of both monetary price and 
operational availability of the equipment.   
This thesis then attempts to analyze similar private 
sector programs and their cost, both in terms of price and 
the turnaround times for the repair to include 
transportation time.  A similar program would be a 
commercial program which meets the requirements to arrest 
corrosion, and thereby preventing equipment degradation.  
The final portion is a comparison of the current program, 
any modification of this program and any private sector 
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facilities that produce the same service, and the possible 
courses of action this data reveals.  
C. METHODOLOGY 
There are two primary methodologies used in this 
thesis for research, analysis and conclusions.  The first 
is a historical method.  This gives a good background as to 
the fundamental reasons for the program, and shows how the 
actual process flows and operates in its current state.  
Data and background information will be collected from 
literature review, Marine Corps Orders and Regulations, 
publications, various on-line databases and personal 
interviews.  These interviews will include personnel 
stationed at Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, and 
Marines from the 1st Force Service Support Group, Camp 
Pendleton.  This includes research into how the other 
Services are meeting similar preventative requirements for 
their ground assets, and finally, analyze any outsourcing 
contracts that may have been awarded.   
Then, an analytical method is used.  This method 
enables a contrast and comparison of the time and cost 
information from the various possibilities and presents a 
conclusion and a recommended course of action.  The 
conclusion will utilize both cost and the length of overall 
repair cycle time as it affects readiness levels with equal 
weight.    
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question is the following:   
• What is the best value among the set of 
alternatives examined in this thesis to 
effectively implement a comprehensive Depot Level 
Corrosion Prevention and Control Program? 
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The subsidiary questions to be addressed in assessing 
this question are as follows: 
• What is Corrosion Control? 
• Why is it important? 
• How does the US Marine Corps currently implement 
this program?  At each level of maintenance. 
• How are similar private industry programs 
implemented? 
• Has this level program requirement been 
outsourced, and if so, what are the results?  
• Can utilizing private sector programs reduce 
costs? 
• Can utilizing private sector programs increase 
equipment readiness to the Operating Forces? 
• Can the present program be modified to increase 
efficiency and return equipment faster to the war 
fighter at a lower cost? 
E. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
This Research is beneficial for enabling clear and 
concise decision making with regards to future courses of 
action. The analysis is intended to determine the Best 
Value for the customer, the Operating Forces of the United 
States Marine Corps.  In the final analysis, the results 
may or may not show there is the ability to lower costs 
and/or lessen repair cycle time by utilizing another 
process.  The intent is to explain all avenues and their 
possibilities, but not to lower or diminish the current 
level of quality.  
F. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter II gives some historical background on 
equipment maintenance and how depot level facilities 
evolved to their status today.  It also explains the 
different echelons of maintenance currently in use in the 
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Marine Corps, and precisely what these differences mean to 
the customer.  It further explains the effect these levels 
have in terms of turnaround repair cycle time, and 
eventually to equipment readiness.  Additionally, 
outsourcing as a possibility to meet this requirement is 
addressed.  
Chapter III deals with specific aspects of the current 
program and some of the challenges associated with it at 
this time.  It looks at the program, principally the 
program at Marine Corps Logistics Base, Barstow, in detail 
and tracks equipment from when it leaves the Battalion 
until it returns.  
Chapter IV is the analysis of the raw data, both 
historical in nature and recently collected. 
Chapter V deals with conclusions and the 
recommendations associated with the reaching of those 
conclusions.  It also shows areas for future research. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The ability of the U.S. Department of Defense 
(DOD) to respond rapidly to National Security and 
Foreign Policy commitments can be adversely 
effected by equipment related factors.  Using 
available resources, minimization of downtime and 
maximization of battle readiness must be 
accomplished through the useful operational life 
of the equipment.  If this is done effectively, 
equipment can be deployed in a timely and 
responsive manner and maintained in the field 
with minimum downtime. (Ref 1) 
The maintenance of aging ground tactical and ground 
support equipment is an enormous challenge to all branches 
of the military service, and The United States Marine Corps 
is no exception.  Budget restrictions over the last decade 
have forced the military to cut back on acquisition 
programs, and to utilize current equipment long beyond 
their original life expectancies.  While the ongoing battle 
to keep over-aged equipment maintained and combat ready is 
a considerable burden to the Commander at the unit level, 
it is also felt at the Depot-level facilities.  In an 
address to the House National Security Subcommittee on 
military readiness, Major General Stewart, USMC, summed up 
the importance of Depot-level maintenance when he stated, 
“The Depot-level Maintenance Program (DLMP) is key to 
ensuring that there is always a stream of operational 
equipment flowing back to the operational forces”. (Ref 2) 
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
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The concept of Depot-level Military facilities is not 
new to the department of Defense.  The War Department 
learned from the War of 1812 the importance of logistics 
and sustainment of their forces.  As a result, the original 
Government Depots were created to meet future supply and 
logistical needs of our war fighters. (Ref 3)  However, as 
the War of 1812 became a distant memory, so too were its 
lessons learned and these Depots fell in to disrepair.   
Over 100 years later, World War II was a rude 
awakening for the military and its readiness.  The nation 
needed to quickly mobilize a massive military complex and 
did not have a program in place to accomplish that task.  
As a result, desperate measures were called for and only 
one week after the brutal attack on Pearl Harbor, Congress 
authorized the War Powers Act. (Ref 4).  This enabled the 
country to direct commercial activities to produce the 
goods and equipment necessary to mobilize our military to 
wage war.   
At the same time, the Government quickly acted to set 
up numerous arsenals, shipyards and Depots to begin to 
support the ongoing War effort.  At the conclusion of the 
War, the military strategists immediately began preparing 
for the distinct possibility of both a massive and 
protracted engagement with the Soviet Union.  Preparation 
for this possibility meant it was necessary to keep this 
huge complex of entities productive and prepared for the 
possibility of war on a moments notice.   
This era, known as the Cold War, lasted for decades 
and the structure and capabilities of the Depot facilities 
remained virtually unchanged.  These numerous Depots 
provided the benefit of a controlled source of maintenance 
and repair for all military hardware, and many laws were 
enacted which gave them almost a monopoly on providing 
these services.  Eventually this stalemate ended with the 
  8
fall of the Soviet Union, and with it came an end to the 
era of vigilant readiness associated with the Cold War.  
This event, and the unrelated quick and decisive victory of 
our Forces in the Gulf in 1991, led to an era of military 
downsizing, decreasing defense budgets and competitive 
outsourcing for goods and services.   
With a diminished threat came the formation of the 
Congressional Base Relocation and Closure Committee.  This 
committee reduced the overall Depot complex from thirty-
eight in the 1980’s to precisely half that number today.  
(Ref 5:p 11)  A reduction in the overall Service wide 
personnel levels led to the associated decline in equipment 
levels, which justified a smaller number of facilities.  Of 
these remaining facilities, the Marine Corps operates two 
Marine Corps Logistics Bases (MCLB): Albany, in Georgia, 
and Barstow, in California.  The Albany facility supports 
Marine Corps Forces located east of the Mississippi, and 
the Barstow facility supports the Forces west of the 
Mississippi.  These two facilities are responsible for the 
5th echelon maintenance of ground tactical and ground 
support equipment in the Marine Corps inventory. 
B. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE DEPOTS 
The mission statement of the Marine Corps Logistics 
Bases is, “To provide supply chain management, maintenance 
management and strategic prepositioning capability to the 
Operating Forces and other customers to maximize their 
readiness and sustainability.” (Ref 6) 
Depot-level maintenance and repair consists of all 
programs dealing with repair, rebuilding and with the 
overhaul of major weapons assemblies.  It also includes 
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some manufacturing of parts, technical support, testing, 
modifications and even software maintenance. (Ref 5:p 2)  
Title 10, subtitle A, Part IV of the United States Code 
governs the conduct of Depot-level maintenance.  It 
essentially requires that the Department of Defense (DOD) 
to maintain organic repair capability for military 
equipment to meet certain wartime requirements.   
The Defense Authorization Act of 1996 directed the DOD 
to develop a maintenance policy which: 
• Establishes core capabilities that are properly 
sized to meet security requirements while 
maintaining cost efficiency and technical 
competency. 
• Provides for organic performance of maintenance 
and repair of any new weapon system defined as 
core systems  
• Provides for public-private cooperation for non 
core workloads (Ref 7:p 1) 
This Act also specified that a maximum of 40 percent 
of Depot funding could be used for outsourcing Depot level 
maintenance to the commercial sector.  However, the Defense 
Authorization Act of 1998 changed that amount to 50 percent 
vice the previous 40 percent.  A May 1995 report by the 
Commission on Roles and Missions made the recommendation 
that many functions performed by DOD activities should be 
either outsourced or privatized, particularly for Depot 
Maintenance.  (Ref 8:p 10)  
C. MARINE CORPS ECHELONS OF MAINTENANCE 
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Both tactical and ground support equipment undergo 
corrective and preventative maintenance in an ongoing 
effort to keep this equipment combat ready.  Authorization 
to perform each facet of maintenance is broken down into 
(3) main categories.  These categories are further divided 
into (5) levels, termed echelons of maintenance.  This 
system is the basis for all maintenance related activities 
performed on ground equipment within the Marine Corps.  In 
addition, each level is also responsible for both 
preventative and/or corrective corrosion inhibition 
actions. 
1. Organizational Maintenance 
The first level for all ground equipment maintenance 
is organizational maintenance, which is performed at the 
using unit, or owning unit level.  It is comprised of both 
preventative and corrective maintenance procedures.  
Corrective maintenance is work performed to remedy a 
specific failure in a piece of gear.  Preventative 
maintenance is designed to prevent a failure from 
occurring, and consists of routine scheduled inspections 
and adjustments.  This category is further subdivided into 
two levels: first and second echelon maintenance. 
a. First Echelon 
This level is primarily where the operator of the 
equipment, i.e. the driver, takes the responsibility and 
actions necessary to make minor adjustments to his 
equipment.  This is the first line of defense in 
preventative maintenance, and first echelon is considered 
the foundation of the maintenance tier. 
b. Second Echelon 
This is also at the using unit level, but these 
individuals are specially trained and qualified, i.e., 
mechanics, to perform this service.  They perform scheduled 
and routine maintenance functions, limited parts 
replacement and minor component assemblies.  These Marines 
have received formal school training in their fields.  
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At these two echelons of maintenance the thorough 
cleaning of equipment is the only requirement for 
preventing future corrosion possibilities. A freshwater 
rinse is one of the simplest yet most effective methods of 
achieving this.  Either the operator or the mechanic easily 
handles this.  
2. Intermediate Maintenance 
Performed by designated maintenance activities, i.e., 
Maintenance Battalion, which is in direct support of the 
owning unit of the equipment.  At this level, Intermediate 
Maintenance functions would involve replacement and/or 
repair of parts and certain subassemblies.  There is also a 
limited amount of repair to major assemblies performed at 
this level.  They also utilize mobile repair teams and 
provide technical assistance as part of their support 
package.  This category is further subdivided into two 
additional echelons, which are also comprised of school 
trained Marines. 
a. Third Echelon 
These personnel perform their maintenance 
functions in machine shops and are authorized to break down 
and repair equipment parts further than the organizational 
level mechanics.  In addition, they have the authority to 
repair and replace parts, subassemblies, and even some 
major components. 
b. Fourth Echelon 
These skilled mechanics work in a highly 
specialized environment with tools and facilities that are 
more specialized than their third echelon counterparts.  
They are authorized complete vehicle diagnostic tests.  It 
is the highest level of intermediate maintenance.   
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These levels of maintenance are responsible for 
thoroughly sealing equipment they repair as a simple and 
cost-effective measure to prevent future corrosive 
degradation.  Every effort must also be made at this level 
to ensure that any possible trapped water is drained as a 
preventative measure.   
3. Depot-Level Maintenance 
This level comprises the last echelon of maintenance, 
fifth echelon. 
a. Fifth Echelon 
The highest category of maintenance and repair 
authorized.  This level of work is completed at either MCLB 
Albany or Barstow, or can be outsourced to commercial 
facilities.  These mostly involve major overhauls or 
complete rebuilding of pieces of equipment and/or major 
weapons systems.  As noted earlier, it may also involve the 
manufacture of repair parts, and or performing authorized 
modifications.  Civilian contractors can also perform this 
level of maintenance. (Ref 9) 
This level of maintenance utilizes commercial 
additives and inhibitors to equipment to mitigate and/or 
prevent corrosion on equipment that has been utilized in 
harsh training climates. 
D. CORROSION CONTROL 
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Corrosion is the unwanted chemical reaction between a 
metallic material and its environment, which reduces the 
strength or other properties essential to the performance 
of a given item or a system. (Ref 10:Encl 1)  
Alternatively, more precisely stated, it is “the 
deterioration of a material, usually a metal, because of a 
reaction with the immediate environment.” (Ref 11)   
To both prevent and correct the problems associated 
with corrosion as it relates to ground equipment; the 
Marine Corps published Marine Corps Order 4790.18, dated 
June of 1994.  This order deals with the Corrosion 
Prevention and Control (CPAC) Program and it assigns 
specific duties and responsibilities to meet the Corps 
preventative and corrective requirements.  It states: 
The essential ingredient to the proper 
preservation of our assets is a solid and 
proactive program of preventative and corrective 
maintenance.  
It further states:  
The establishment of the CPAC program is an 
effort to improve readiness and combat 
capability, to extend the service life of both 
current and future vehicle and equipment 
initiatives, an to reduce maintenance 
requirements and associated costs. (Ref 10:pp 1-
2)  
E. CONTRACTOR SUPPORT 
Our goal is to capitalize on innovation, 
experimentation and technology, to prepare Marine 
Forces to succeed in the 21st century.  Our aims 
are to…enhance experimentation to include ways to 
accomplish acquisition, logistic and support 
tasks through technical innovations, outsourcing 
and their techniques…   Marine Corps Strategy 21 
The DOD policy governing Depot Maintenance operations 
is predicated on the ability to provide flexible, timely 
and cost effective support to its customers.  Prior to 1987 
these maintenance capabilities were a legacy of the 
protracted Cold War, designed to sustain engagement with a 
sizeable enemy on a global scale.  Since that time, many 
support services have routinely been competed with a 
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growing private sector base that often times gives the 
customer and DOD a better value. (Ref 5:p 2) 
The Defense Authorization Act of 1998 allows for up to 
50 percent of Depot level maintenance activities to be 
outsourced to commercial or private sector activities.  As 
noted earlier, the Depot facility must provide for organic 
performance of maintenance and repair of any core system.  
The Office of the Secretary of Defense decides what 
constitutes a core system.  This decision is made from 
extrapolating information with regard to each Service’s 
role in the Defense Planning Guidance.  The current policy 
still utilizes the two Major Regional Conflict scenarios to 
make these determinations.  CPAC is not designated as a 
Depot level required Core competency. 
The General Accounting Office (GAO) considers that 
competition from private industry with the public Depots is 
the main factor in reducing costs associated with Depot-
level repairs.  (Ref 7:p 2)  This factor has dramatically 
changed the business procedures and processes of these 
Depots, and they are proving to be increasingly competitive 
in the marketplace.  A GAO commercial activities panel 
concluded in April of 2002: 
Competitions including public-private 
competitions have been shown to produce 
significant cost savings for the government, 
regardless of whether a public or a private 
entity is selected. (Ref 12) 
Three major changes have affected the entire DOD Depot 
Maintenance Programs in the last fifteen years.  First, the 
Base Relocation and Closure Committee reduced the overall 
number of facilities from 38 to 19.  Second, the overall 
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numbers of maintenance personnel have decreased by 59 
percent.  This is significant in that this is the third 
highest percentage decrease felt by any category of DOD 
civilian personnel during this timeframe.  The last factor 
is that the private sector may compete for up to half the 
traditional Depot workload.  While the Depots have 
scrambled to implement more efficient business practices 
and processes, the facilities themselves have not had the 
required capital investment in equipment.  (Ref 8:p 10)  As 
a result, as of this year, 44 percent of the total Depot-
level workload is being outsourced to private industry. 
(Ref 13) 
The following chart shows how between 1987 and 2000, 
there has been a significant shift toward outsourcing 
services by the Depots.  The increase of the funds budgeted 
to Depot level maintenance has grown by 24 percent but of 
those funds the private sector allocation has raised by 
roughly 90 percent in that timeframe. 
 
SECTOR FY 1987 FY 2000 CHANGE $ % CHANGE 
Public $8.7  $8.2  $-.5  -6 
Private $4.0  $7.6  $3.6  +90 
TOTAL $12.7  $15.8  +$3.1  +4 
*Dollar Figures are in Billions 
Table 2.1. Outsource Shift from 1987-2000.  (From:  
GAO Report Titled “Sustaining Readiness Support 
Capabilities Requires a Comprehensive Plan”, dated 
March of 2001. 
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It is important to note that competitions between the 
public and private sector must take into consideration cost 
as a factor.  Cost must always be considered, but it only 
one of many factors which comprise the best value package.  
Part 15 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) states 
that in competitive regulations the solicitation process is 
designed to foster an impartial and comprehensive 
evaluation leading to the selection of the proposal 
representing the best value to the Government. (Ref 14)  It 
is known as the Trade-Off process, where there may be a 
trade-off between cost and non-cost factors to allow the 
contracting office to accept an offer other than the lowest 
price.  Quality of Service, reliability and past 
performance are valuable considerations in today’s 
marketplace.  Another factor is turnaround time, or Repair 
Cycle time to include transportation time, which translates 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
  18
III. SPECIFICATIONS 
A. MILITARY EQUIPMENT READINESS 
In a press release dated March 7, 2002, The Honorable 
Joel Hefley, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Military 
Readiness of the House Armed Services Committee, stated the 
following: 
I believe that the readiness of our Armed Forces 
has been on life support for a number of years 
and that dedicated corrective actions must be 
taken and sustained to provide the best equipment 
and facilities for the men and women of the Armed 
Forces.  (Ref 15) 
The 1995 DOD Annual Report sums up the importance of 
Readiness to the military community in just one sentence: 
“Readiness is the Department of Defense’s number one 
priority.” (Ref 16)  Readiness is the foundation that 
enables our Forces to be able to fight and to execute the 
elements of the National Security Strategy and win our 
nation’s wars.  The Department of Defense is mandated under 
Title 10 of the United States Code to prepare quarterly 
readiness reports to Congress.  This report must contain: 
(1) each readiness problem and deficiency identified…; (2) 
planned remedial actions; and (3) the key indicators and 
relevant information related to each problem and 
deficiency.   
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The numbers and statistics that make up this report 
are derived from the information received from roughly 
9,000 military units.  These are compiled on a monthly 
basis from an automated system universally known as Status 
of Resources and Training System (SORTS).  SORTS has 
recently evolved into GSORTS, which stands for Global 
Status of Resources and Training System.  As the acronym 
SORTS is more readily recognized, it will be utilized vice 
GSORTS in this research.  The overall term “Readiness”, is 
comprised of three elements: Personnel Readiness, Equipment 
Readiness and Training Readiness.  This study concentrates 
solely on the Equipment Readiness portion of this triad, as 
it pertains to the overall military readiness picture.  In 
particular, this study deals with the equipment of the I 
Marine Expeditionary Force (IMEF).  
B. MARINE CORPS GROUND EQUIPMENT READINESS 
Military equipment readiness numbers are derived from 
a simple mathematical formula.  They show the percentage of 
a particular type asset that are available or mission 
capable for the execution of a designated mission.  The 
percentage not available is considered “deadlined”.  The 
following terminology is utilized in the Marine Corps when 
dealing with the reporting of ground equipment readiness: 
• Allowance Item:  Refers to the quantity of items 
allowed to a particular unit as prescribed by the 
Marine Corps Table of Equipment (T/E), or other 
authorized allowance publications.  For Type I 
Equipment, Mission Essential Items, the On-Hand 
Quantity (O/H Qty) should always equal the 
Allowable Quantity. 
• Deadlined Equipment:  A piece of equipment is 
considered deadlined when it is Not Mission 
Capable (NMC).  This means it cannot perform its 
designated combat mission due to the need for 
critical repairs.  NMC is further subdivided into 
two reporting categories. 
• NMCM: Not Mission Capable Maintenance.  This 
indicates the equipment is deadlined due to 
awaiting maintenance. 
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• NMCS: Not mission Capable Supply.  This indicates 
that the equipment is deadlined because it is 
awaiting parts. (Ref 17) 
The mathematical formula that denotes the Readiness 
Rating of a particular type of equipment in terms of a 
percentage is as follows: 
 
Readiness Rating = [(Poss. Qty – DL Qty)/ Poss. Qty] 
 
Simply put, it is the number of pieces on hand 
(possessed), minus the ones designated NMC (DL Quantity), 
and divided by the number on hand (possessed).  For 
example: Unit A has (20) 5-Ton Vehicles.  (4) of these are 
NMC.  The Readiness Rating is 80% = (20 – 4 / 20) 
The Marine Corps considers Equipment Readiness as that 
percentage of a type of equipment that is available to the 
unit so that the unit is able to perform its mission.  
However, a piece of equipment may not actually be 
“deadlined’ to be categorized in the NMC category.  It may 
simply be “unavailable” to the Commander to accomplish his 
mission.  As it is not readily available to the Commander, 
it cannot be relied on at that time, so it decreases the 
readiness numbers accordingly.  Equipment that has been 
inducted into the Depot level CPAC, (commonly referred to 
as the C3 program) are actually Fully Mission Capable 
(FMC), a requirement of the program.  However, it is listed 
on the SORTS report as technically NMC due to its lack of 
availability, with the appropriate annotation in the 
REMARKS SECTION as to why. 
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Therefore, a decrease in the time required for 
transportation, storage or the faster eventual return 
transportation to the battalion would naturally increase 
readiness percentages.  Faster throughput equates to higher 
readiness.  Simply put, the faster equipment flows through 
the system (the CPAC process to include transportation), 
the faster it is returned to the battalion, and the sooner 
it is available for use by the Commander.   
C. CYCLE TIME  
IMEF Forces traditionally utilize MCLB Barstow 
Maintenance Center for their Depot level CPAC requirements.  
IMEF Marines are located a minimum of 150 miles away in 
various locations in southern California, with the greatest 
concentration being at Camp Pendleton in Oceanside.  The 
responsible entities for the transportation of equipment 
(with regards to CPAC) are governed by two separate 
contracts.  The Transportation Management Office (TMO), 
MCB, Camp Pendleton, handles the transportation from Camp 
Pendleton to MCLB Barstow through commercial contracts.  
The return transportation is done through civilian 
contractors operating out of MCLB Barstow.   
The current C3 Chief at GSM Company, Maintenance 
Battalion, 1st Force Service Support Group (FSSG), stated 
that the approximate average turnaround time for a piece of 
gear to be away from the unit, for this program, is between 
56 and 65 days. (Ref 18)  He also stated that the time 
through the program itself is 30 days (for planning 
purposes) but most gear gets through the program on average 
in 25 days. (Ref 19)  In fact, The Memorandum of Agreement 
(MOA) between the Commanding General of IMEF and Commander, 
Maintenance Center, MCLB Barstow, specifies the following:  
Equipment turnaround time at Maintenance Center, 
Barstow will depend on TAM types and Category 
Codes selected, but in no case will turnaround 
time exceed (35) days from induction at 
Maintenance Center, Barstow to the completion 
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date.  Transportation time is not included in 
this turnaround time. (Ref 20) 
The important thing to remember is that regardless of 
where the gear is during this process (i.e. being painted 
in the C3 program, or awaiting return transportation in the 
open-air lot in Barstow) it is still NMC.  Reducing the 
transportation portion of this overall 56 to 65 day process 
could quickly elevate a battalion’s equipment readiness 
levels.  Either the reduction of, or complete elimination 
of, the transportation days could achieve this.  
D. CPAC TRANSPORTATION FOR I MEF UNITS 
MCLB Barstow is only 150 miles from Marine Corps Base, 
Camp Pendleton.  However, for planning purposes an average 
of 175 miles is used, as IMEF units are located in various 
locations in southern California.  Accordingly, an average 
round trip for a piece of equipment is 350 miles.  Two 
salient questions must be answered.  First, what is the 
fastest yet most economical method of transporting ground 
equipment from southern California military instillations 
to the Logistics Base at Barstow?  Second, is the trip, in 
fact, necessary? 
1. Speed 
Faster turnaround time for assets transported between 
Camp Pendleton and Barstow and back again has received 
serious consideration over the years.  Yet this thesis will 
show that the final result is today the equipment readiness 
levels in IMEF are lower than necessary due to an extremely 
inefficient transportation process.  In early 1998 an MOA 
for a Secondary Reparable Maintenance Process Test was 
signed between the CG 1st FSSG and the CG MARCORLOGBASES 
Albany Georgia.  This agreement governed secondary 
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reparable issues between IMEF and MCLB Barstow.  Of note is 
that the same transportation issues are evident with this 
issue as are found in the sending of assets to Barstow for 
the CPAC program.  The MOA states the following in the 
Concept Plan: 
Utilization of existing Garrison Mobile Equipment 
assets at Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton 
California, possibly supplemented by established 
commercial rapid transit transportation services, 
has been selected in order to minimize transit 
times. (Ref 21:p 1) 
The Garrison Mobile Equipment assets noted above are 
assets organic to Base Motors, Marine Corps Base, Camp 
Pendleton. This conclusion was the result of research by 
the Camp Pendleton Traffic Management Office (TMO) for the 
Secondary Reparable Test Committee. 
2. Costs 
In addition to noting that utilizing organic assets 
sped up transportation, the following was also noted under 
the Transportation plan of the MOA:  
Marine Corps Base (MCB) Camp Pendleton, 
California, Garrison Mobile Equipment (GME) will 
be utilized as the primary means of 
transportation for the SRMPT items to/from MCLB 
Barstow, California during the test period of 1 
April 1998 through July 1, 1998.  The basis of 
the decision was that GME transportation is more 
flexible, responsive and economical (a savings of 
$130.04 per trip).  (Ref 21:p 4) 
The committee concluded that utilizing organic IMEF 
transportation assets was both the most efficient and cost 
effective method of transporting equipment between these 
locations.  However, the current transportation policy does 
not utilize Base Motors.  This is a direct result of a 
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funding issue.  Base Motors requires reimbursement from the 
IMEF Comptroller for any trips to and from Barstow.  
However, the funding is already obligated by HQMC to TMO 
for this requirement, so the comptroller will not authorize 
reimbursement of scarce O&M funds designated for the 
Operating Forces.  TMO receives funding for “second 
destination transportation” requirements.  It is extremely 
difficult to redirect these funds to Base Motors, after the 
fact.  The Base Motors Fund Administrator explains it as 
follows: 
TMO is funded for second destination 
transportation.  Headquarters Marine 
Corpsprovides an allotment for support of this 
type.  For SWRFT [Base Motors] support- we need 
the customer to fund the support, either 
reimbursable or by direct citation of funds- or 
we’ll take a check. This is where the funding 
problems are.  SWRFT did not have funding in 
place prior to accomplishing the support, and 
when these funds were provided they were 
insufficient.  That’s why our support was 
discontinued; we couldn’t get the cost covered by 
Base or the MEF. (Ref 22)    
The result is a less efficient transportation process 
that in turn both lowers equipment Readiness levels and is 
more expensive for the taxpayer.   
E. COMMERCIAL PROGRAMS 
Major General D. M. McCarthy, USMCR, made the 
following statement to the Senate Appropriations Committee 
Subcommittee on Defense in 2002. 
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Corrosion Control funding is, as always, a high 
priority to all Marine Corps units.  Current 
funding provides relief, but the pending 
requirements for Corrosion Control repairs to 
equipment located at our home training centers 
remains a challenge.  The aging of our equipment 
plays a major role in this area.  We are 
outsourcing and competitively bidding some of our 
intermediate maintenance requirements as an 
innovative way to stretch the maintenance 
dollars. (Ref 23) 
Is outsourcing this process an answer to increasing 
Battalion equipment Readiness levels?  The Reserve Forces 
seem to believe that is the case.  In addition, IMEF is 
also augmenting the Depot level program with a commercial 
activity.  At present, not all the equipment that requires 
Depot level CPAC induction is being sent to Barstow from 
the Operating Forces.  Some ground tactical and ground 
support equipment stay in the southern California area for 
their treatment.  Many are sent for service to a small firm 
located in southern Orange County, less than 20 miles from 
the front gate at Camp Pendleton.  This firm is Drezek 
Environmental Striping System (DES), and its facilities are 
located in San Juan Capistrano.  The IMEF C3 Chief stated, 
“Drezek is a vendor who can do almost everything that 
Barstow can but they are much smaller…they are usually 
cheaper, they work at their site/San Juan Capistrano, and 
the turnover is always faster, with exceptions.” (Ref 24)  
He estimates the average turnaround time for equipment is 
12 to 15 days (compared to 56-65 days for equipment sent to 
Barstow).  This private sector program is less expensive 
with a quicker turnaround time than the present program 
located in Barstow.  The drawback is the facility is not 
large enough to meet a significantly greater demand.   
F. VOLUME FLOW THROUGH MCLB BARSTOW CPAC PROGRAM 
Equipment entering the Program at Barstow is divided 
in to one of three categories depending on their 
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requirements.  These categories are broken down as follows, 
with A being the simplest and C being the most inclusive: 
• Category A:  Surface preparation, paint and 
undercoating; no bodywork. (This category is 
corrective in nature and applies to items painted 
with latex/alkyd).  
• Category B: Surface preparation, paint and 
undercoating with bodywork due to the corrosion 
replacement or repair of corroded components such 
as door, battery boxes, or fenders with time of 
work not to exceed 8 hours. 
• Category C:  Includes everything listed in 
category B in addition to some component 
disassembly required to treat corrosion. Bodywork 
should not exceed 40 hours.  (Ref 25) 
The volume of items, which have gone through the 
program under each of these categories for the last three 
fiscal years, are as follows (the numbers denote total 
pieces of equipment): 
The disparity between FY01 and the other two years 
results from the timing of receiving funds at the 
conclusion of the Congressional Budget resolution.  It does 
not indicate there were insufficient funds to meet demand 
in the other years.  The funds allocated for IMEF for this 
program have been sufficient to meet their demand over 
these three years.  
 
    FY        Cat. A     Cat. B     Cat. C       Cost  
00 124 70 39 $938,141 
01 136 124 128 $3,060,390 
02 101 80 10 $910,890 
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Table 3.1. Money Spent Over the Last Three Fiscal 
Years by IMEF on Corrosion Prevention at the Depot. 




The work performed at MCLB Barstow is vital to 
equipment readiness, of extremely good quality and the 
process itself is time efficient.  The monetary cost of 
this service has not been a factor as it has been borne by 
the MEF comptroller vice the individual Battalion 
Commanders.  Even the transportation costs are paid out of 
a fund at TMO and pre designated for this service by HQMC.  
Though the C3 designated funds have decreased steadily over 
the last few years, it has been of ample size to 
accommodate the demands of the Operating Forces. 
However, the overall program may require process 
improvement.  Taking equipment readiness and overall 
monetary costs (to include both the program itself and the 
transportation involved), there may well be viable 
alternatives.  This thesis will show that at present the 
total time the gear is out of the hands of the warfighter 
is excessive, and overall costs could be significantly 
reduced. Using Readiness levels and Cost as evaluation 
criteria, the next chapter compares two options to the 
status quo.     
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IV. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES 
A. COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES  
Previous chapters established that the Corrosion 
Prevention and Control Program mandated by Marine Corps 
Order is considered an essential part of the overall 
maintenance policy for ground equipment readiness.  The key 
is to implement the requirements of the program in a way 
that gives the best value to the Operating Forces.  Best 
Value, in this case, is that option which meets the basic 
program requirements in the most time efficient and cost 
effective manner.  
The following analyzes the present program, (the 
status quo) a variation of this program utilizing Base 
Motors for transportation purposes, and finally an 
outsourced commercial option.  The comparisons utilize both 
cost and turn around time (read: Increased Readiness 
levels) as overall factors in the final decision.  Four 
distinct areas affect Cost and Readiness levels.  Of these, 
the transportation portion of the process has two important 
factors, transportation turn around time and overall cost.  
Then, there is the cost involved with the actual protection 
of the equipment, and finally how these factors affect 
Readiness levels.       
B. TRANSPORTATION EFFICIENCY AND COST 
1. Transportation Time Efficiency 
  29
Under the present process, a piece of equipment must 
currently travel an excessively long journey combined with 
frequent stops, from the Parent Battalion in Southern 
California, to the Depot for the CPAC program, and back 
again.  
 












Figure 4.1. Transportation Flow. 
 
 
A detailed analysis shows the equipment must first 
travel from the Battalion to the 22-area TMO lot at Camp 
Pendleton, usually utilizing Base Motors for the journey.  
Once there, it awaits transportation by civilian contractor 
for the 150 miles to MCLB Barstow.  It arrives and is put 
in the line/queue for the CPAC Program.  From there, it 
makes its way through the program, and upon completion, it 
is put in an open-air desert lot.  There, it waits for a 
different civilian contractor to pick it up for return 
transportation to the 22-area TMO lot back at Camp 
Pendleton.  Here the equipment is unloaded and again waits 
for Base Motors to move it back to the battalion lot.  This 
complex scheme involves three separate entities in the 
transportation process: Base Motors; TMO Camp Pendleton 
contracted carrier; and, the transportation carrier 
utilized by MCLB Barstow. 
The transportation flow chart for when Base Motors 
handled the transportation during a six-month period from 
December 2000 through June 2001 was less complex.  (Ref 22)  
It not only eliminated two unnecessary steps in the 
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process, it also kept all the transportation in the control 








Figure 4.2. Transportation Flow. 
 
Under this process, Base Motors came to the Unit and 
picked up, receipted for, and transported the gear directly 
to MCLB Barstow without any intermediate stops.  Upon 
completion of the CPAC program at Barstow, Base Motors was 
notified and took the gear from the lot in Barstow back to 
the Unit at Camp Pendleton.  This process significantly 
reduced transportation time for the process as a whole. 
Similarly, equipment that is sent to DES, the 
commercial contractor for its corrosion work, travels a 








Figure 4.3. Transportation Flow. 
 
The biggest difference is that since the gear goes to 
San Juan Capistrano vice Barstow, the overall travel 
distance is only a small portion of that required to get to 
Barstow and return.  This civilian contractor is located 
within ten miles of Camp Pendleton.  This is under ten 
percent of the travel distance to get to MCLB Barstow.  
To find the average travel times for the 
transportation process of these three scenarios, a simple 
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formula is used.  First, we find the total time the gear is 
listed as NMC at the Battalion, and then, the average time 
gear is received and processed through CPAC is subtracted.  
The result is the travel time. 
To find the average time the gear is away from the 
battalion requires researching the Marine Corps Integrated 
Maintenance Management System (MIMMS) database.  The 
Maintenance Information Systems Coordination Office 
(MISCO), located at the 1st FSSG, researched vast numbers 
of records and provided the raw data needed to find the 
information required.  Table 4.1 is a sample of those 
records provided, which tell how long the assets were 
listed as being NMC by the individual battalions. 
 
         OWN   DATE  DEST  DATE   TAM     NOMEN 
         UAC   RCV   UAC   CLOSED NR 
 
         28301 02112 DREZC 02175  D1159   M1044 
         28301 02112 DREZC 02175  D1159   M1044 
         28301 02112 DREZC 02175  D1159   M1044 
         28321 02112 DREZC 02131  D1158   M1123 
         28321 02112 DREZC 02131  D1158   M1123 
         28321 02112 DREZC 02131  D1158   M1123 
         28321 02120 BARSO 02158  D0880   M149 
         28321 02120 BARSO 02162  D0880   M353 
         28321 02120 BARSO 02158  D0880   M353 
         28301 02120 BARSO 02162  D1159   M1044 
         28310 02112 BARSO 02162  D0880   M149A2 
         11400 02112 BARSO 02158  B2460   1150E 
         11400 02112 BARSO 02162  B2482   C-TRACTOR 
 
Table 4.1. Sample of Records Provided. 
 
Information has been provided on all assets sent to 
either DES or Barstow for Corrosion Prevention during two 
distinct timeframes.  The first time period coincides with 
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the six-month window during which Base Motors handled the 
transportation, and the second, is a similar six-month 
period with civilian contracted transportation.  The 
civilian contractors mentioned are a combination of both 
the contractors performing out of Camp Pendleton and those 
working out of MCLB Barstow.  
The database reveals that when civilian carriers are 
used to travel to MCLB Barstow, the average time the 
equipment is listed as NMC for the SORTS report is 70.04 
days.  This is slightly higher than the estimates given by 
the C3 Chief.  The average time the gear is listed as NMC, 
when it goes to DES in San Juan Capistrano, is only 28.7 
days.  For rounding purposes, we use seventy-one and 
twenty-nine days, respectively.  The average time the gear 
was down, when Base Motors handled the transportation to 
MCLB Barstow, was 45.16 days, or forty-six days, for 
rounding purposes. (Ref 26) 
Next, it is necessary to subtract the amount of time 
the equipment spent both in the queue at Barstow and 
through the actual CPAC program itself.  The remaining time 
is that which was taken for transportation.  An examination 
of the C3 tracking report received from the Program Manager 
at Barstow indicates that the average time for gear to be 
received and go though the C3 program is a little over 30 
days.  This is an average of all assets regardless of the 
category of work being performed at the facility.  This 
time includes waiting time in the line/queue until it 





RUC # JON # CAT REC IND STM BLT SHMT UC UC PT LUB FINL 
                          
          CWC CWC CWC CWC CWC CWC CWC CWC
      DATE DATE 746 746 742 744 746 749 744 744 
m00373 211s57 a 27-Jun 27-Jun 1-Jul 31-Jul     7-Aug 5-Sep     
m20470 211s56 b 28-Jun 16-Jul 5-Aug 20-Aug weld 5-Sep         
m00371 211s30 a 9-Jul 19-Jul 20-Aug 29-Aug   28-Aug   5-Sep     
m00371 211s30 a 10-Jul 19-Jul 20-Aug 29-Aug   28-Aug   5-Sep     
m00371 211s32 a 11-Jul 16-Jul 23-Aug 3-Sep       5-Sep     
m20470 211s51 b 11-Jul 16-Jul 25-Jul 13-Aug 13-Aug 23-Aug   29-Aug 5-Sep   
m21300 211s09 a 12-Jul 16-Jul 20-Aug 4-Sep       5-Sep     
m21300 211s40 a 12-Jul 16-Jul 18-Jul 9-Aug n/a n/a n/a 5-Sep     
m21300 211s40 a 12-Jul 16-Jul 18-Jul 9-Aug n/a n/a n/a 29-Aug   5-Sep
m21300 211s09 a 12-Jul 16-Jul 20-Aug 3-Sep       5-Sep     
m00880 211s93 a 12-Jul 16-Jul 20-Aug 3-Sep       5-Sep     
m28333 211s47 b 12-Jul 16-Jul 19-Jul 27-Jul 28-Jul     19-Aug hold   
m28333 2211s55 b 12-Jul 16-Jul 19-Jul 27-Jul 28-Jul     19-Aug hold   
m21300 211s14 a 12-Jul 16-Jul 25-Jul 5-Sep             
m21300 211s14 a 12-Jul 16-Jul 25-Jul 5-Sep             
m21300 211s14 a 12-Jul 16-Jul 31-Jul hold repair             
m11400 211s21 a 18-Jul 22-Jul 27-Jul 13-Aug 23-Aug 29-Aug   5-Sep     
m11400 211s21 a 18-Jul 22-Jul 23-Aug 29-Aug   5-Sep         
m11400 211s30 a 18-Jul 20-Jul 24-Jul 29-Aug   28-Aug   5-Sep     
  
Table 4.2. Sample of Graphical Chart. 
 
Table 4.2 is one portion of a number of graphical 
charts provided in an extensive database by the MCLB 
Barstow C3 program.  This particular example breaks down 
the receipt of individual pieces of equipment by date, and 
by how long it takes to move through the portions of the 
process.  From this database, it was extrapolated that the 
time the gear arrives in Barstow, until it completes the 
program, takes just over thirty days, on average.  For 
rounding purposes, thirty-one days will be used.  The 
average time gear takes to go through DES is fifteen days. 
Assets going to Barstow utilizing a civilian carrier 
are listed as NMC for an average of seventy-one days.  The 
time through the program is thirty-one days.  That means 
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the average amount of time for transportation is forty 
days.  With Base Motors, the turnaround time is forty-six 
days.  Again, the average time of waiting plus processing 
at Barstow of thirty-one days is subtracted, which leaves 
an average of fifteen travel days.  The average time 
equipment going to DES is listed as NMC is twenty-eight 
days, with the average time through the program of fifteen 
days.  Travel time for DES equipment is thirteen days, 
slightly less than what Base Motors takes for their trip to 
Barstow.  This data reveals that using the current process 
with civilian carriers to take gear for C3 requirements to 
Barstow is much less efficient from a transportation time 
standpoint than the two alternatives. 
2. Transportation Cost  
The cost comparison between the present uses of 
civilian carrier(s), as apposed to Base Motors, is not a 
simple one-for-one comparison.  Though there is data for 
both the six-month time frame Base Motors provided this 
service, and a similar six-month period for the civilian 
carrier(s), there are two problems with this approach.  
First, the exact same loads utilizing exactly the same type 
of vehicles were not run during those time frames.  
Secondly, the figures on transportation costs provided by 
TMO also contain SECREP transportation to Barstow, and it 
is impossible to distinguish between the two programs for 
comparison purposes.  The MCLB Barstow transportation 
contractor, EG&G, bills all their transportation to a 
single line of appropriation, which makes it impossible to 
distinguish what program the transportation is being billed 
for at the time.  The company states they cannot 
distinguish between other transportation they perform for 
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the Marine Corps which is separate from the Corrosion 
Control Program. (Ref 27). 
However, there are two other sources of information 
for comparison purposes.  The first is the TMO study 
provided for by the MOA between the CG 1st FSSG and CG 
MARCORLOGBASES, which states that Base Motors should 
provide the transportation to Barstow and is more 
“flexible, responsive and economical.”  (Ref 21:p 4)  
Though this MOA dealt with secondary reparables vice 
equipment bound for the C3 program, the transportation 
requirements were virtually identical.  
Secondly, the Fund Administrator for Base Motors 
provided the following information: 
To aid in your computations - a SWRFT (SouthWest 
Regional Fleet Transportation, formerly Base 
Motors)) T/T (tractor-trailer) costs $33.84 per 
hour (to include driver/fuel/maint/overhead).  As 
a guide – it’s a 8 -9 hours trip to Barstow with 
a tractor trailer, bringing the per trip price to 
an average of $288 per vehicle – per trip…The 
difference in price [compared to the civilian 
carrier] is probably due to TMO/HQMC including 
civilian labor in their pricing, and the SWRFT 
only includes temp hire labor for surge 
requirements in our pricing structure (no GS or 
WG labor included in our flat rates).  Our flat 
rates were based on out of pocket expenses – not 
a venue to subsidize labor cost. (Ref 28)  
EG&G, the commercial contractor used by MCLB Barstow, 
charges a flat rate of $494 for one way travel on a flatbed 
truck to Camp Pendleton. (Ref 27)  The cost for both ways 
is $988.  The pricing list from Camp Pendleton is within a 
couple of dollars of EG&G, making it almost three and a 
half times the cost to use Base Motors (given the quoted 
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price of $288 from their Fund Administrator).  From a cost 
of transportation standpoint, the present system is 
considerably more costly than using organic transportation.  
The cost to go the small distance to DES using either a 
civilian contractor or Base Motors is far less expensive 
than going to Barstow.  
C. COSTS TO PROTECT EQUIPMENT  
Another cost of the Corrosion Prevention and Control 
Program is the actual costs to have the equipment undergo 
the process.  The only comparison required here is between 
MCLB Barstow and DES for performing a similar requirement.  
Since the most common asset sent to DES by the C3 
representative is the HMMVEE, that cost is used for 
comparison purposes.  There are numerous variants of the 
HMMVEE, as well as different categories of service they may 
require.  The following chart, Table 4.3, lists the price 
charged by MCLB Barstow for their services, as provided by 
the MCLB representative to IMEF. 
 
TAM       VARIANT                CAT A        CAT B        CAT C 
 
 
D1001     M-997                   $5602.22     $6336.67     $9274.53 
D1002     M-1035                  $5051.39     $5785.84     $8723.63 
D1125     M-1045/M-1046           $5201.57     $5920.46     $8873.81 
D1158     M-998/M-1038/M-1123     $4780.03     $5514.48     $8452.27 
D1159     M-1043/M-1044           $5793.31     $6532.76     $9470.55 
D1180     M-1037/M-1042           $5793.31     $6532.76     $9470.55 
D0
 
187     M-1097                  $5793.31     $6532.76     $9470.55 
Table 4.3. Price Charged by MCLB Barstow. 
 
The comparable price for DES to do, Framework, 
undercoating and complete repainting for a D1158 is 
$4987.00, slightly less than MCLB Barstow.  This is the 
vehicle that constitutes the vast majority of their current 
work for the Marine Corps.   
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D. EFFECT ON READINESS LEVELS 
Readiness is the Department of Defense’s number 
one priority.  Thus, it is committed to taking 
those steps necessary to ensure its Forces are 
ready to execute their missions. (Ref 29) 
As stated numerous times, the number one priority for 
the Department of Defense is Readiness.  Readiness is 
synonymous with Operational Availability (Ao).  Ao is 
simply the number of FMC pieces of equipment, divided by 
the number of pieces on hand.  This is the same formula for 
Readiness Rating as stated earlier: 
 
Readiness Rating = [Poss. Qty – DL Qty/Poss. Qty] 
 
It is simple mathematics to reason, therefore, that 
the higher the number of FMC assets the higher Readiness 
percentage numbers will be.  The faster an item is returned 
to the Commander, the faster it reverts from NMC to FMC.  
It has already been established that the scenario that 
designates equipment as being in a NMC status the longest 
is the current process in effect for C3 requirements for 
IMEF Forces.  This is due to an extremely inefficient 
transportation process.  If Readiness levels are the number 
one priority in the Department of Defense, any reasonable 
scenario that raises these levels should be given serious 
consideration for implementation.  It can also be argued 
that Cost factors directly affect Readiness levels.  If the 
cost is excessive, and/or the funds are not available, 
readiness will decrease.  However, in this case, it has 
been shown that the funds apportioned have been sufficient 
to meet the demand requirements.   
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E. MATRIX SUMMARY 
The criteria used here to decide a Best Value course 
of action for implementing a CPAC program is based on both 
Readiness and Cost criteria.  Both have been given equal 
weight in the overall evaluation process.  Readiness is 
considered the cornerstone for military preparedness by the 
DOD, while cost is always a serious concern in an era of 
shrinking budgets.  The analysis of the data gathered has 
been summarized to interpret the results and assist in 
recommending a course of action.  As Readiness and Cost are 
weighted equally, there is no requirement to put additional 
value toward one factor vice another.  From the empirical 
research that has been conducted, the boxes will be filled 
in as follows: the number (3) denotes the best option, a 
number (2) denotes the second best option, and the number 









Present 1  1 *1.5 1 
Base Mtr 2  2 *1.5 2 
DES 3 3 3 3 
* denotes a tie for 2nd and 3rd place. 
Table 4.4. Matrix Summary. 
 
By simply adding up the totals for each option, with 
the highest number indicating the best value option, the 
results are as follows: 
DES               Total Point Value 12 
Base Motors       Total Point Value 7.5 
Present Program   Total Point Value 4.5 
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This evaluation criterion shows the Best Value to be 
to utilize DES to its capacity, which has been shown to be 
limited.  When that resource is quickly maximized, 
equipment should travel to MCLB Barstow via Base Motors.  
The IMEF Comptroller should work out arrangements with HQMC 
to ensure the funds previously designated for TMO for this 
transportation can be re-designated to Base Motors.  This 
cost should not be borne out of O&M designated funds.  The 
least favorable option, the status quo, is far too costly 
and time consuming and should not be used unless it can be 
significantly improved upon. 
Although the evaluation method may seem overly simple, 
it suffices in this instance.  One could certainly argue 
that equal weights are not appropriate, for example, 
between readiness and transportation cost.  Another 
criticism could be made that giving ordinal weights (1st, 
2nd, 3rd) to the alternatives is not especially rigorous, 
because it ignores the detailed comparison data (e.g., on 
costs) that has been gathered.  And in general, a more 
sophisticated multiple attribute comparison would be 
recommended. (Ref 30)  However, because in this case DES 
was superior on all criteria, a more sophisticated analysis 
would not change the result.  While a more sophisticated 
evaluation tool might also be useful in performing 
sensitivity analysis on our basic result, given the 
overwhelming superiority of the DES alternative, such an 
analysis was deemed unnecessary. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. IS A DEPOT-LEVEL CPAC PROGRAM NECESSARY? 
1. Conclusion 
The requirement for a Depot-level CPAC program is, and 
will continue to be, a priority for the Marine Corps.  It 
has been demonstrated that equipment Readiness is paramount 
to the war fighter, and this process is an essential part 
of keeping aged equipment Mission Capable.  The value 
obtained from this process adds considerable life to 
equipment which continually operates under harsh 
environments.  
2. Recommendation 
The need for this requirement is greater than ever, 
and an even greater emphasis should be made on compliance 
with the standards of the Marine Corps Order by the 
individual unit Commanders.    
B. IS THE CURRENT PROGRAM FOR I MEF UNITS EFFICIENT? 
1. Conclusion 
Yes and No.  The actual CPAC process currently being 
run through MCLB Barstow is extremely efficient in its 
ability to prevent and/or correct corrosion.  However, the 
transportation process for the ground tactical and ground 
support equipment to and from the Depot is extremely 
inefficient.  In addition to being overly time-consuming, 
it is comparably expensive.  The amount of time the 
equipment is out of the hands of the Battalion Commander is 
excessive, and as a result unnecessarily decreases 
equipment Readiness levels.  This inefficiency is due 
almost exclusively to the complex transportation process 
being used.  
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2. Recommendation 
The current program needs to be revised.  Two options 
have been demonstrated which are faster than the status 
quo, result in higher overall Readiness ratings, and are 
lower in cost. 
C. IS THERE SOMETHING SPECIFIC WHICH SHOULD BE 
IMPLEMENTED TO IMPROVE THE OVERALL PROGRAM? 
1. Conclusion 
Yes.  The analysis has shown that the best option 
available is to use the present commercial vendor in San 
Juan Capistrano.  This option is limited in that this 
facility has a limited capability and overall size, which 
precludes it from performing large amounts of work.  The 
next best option is to use Base Motors to transport the 
equipment to MCLB Barstow for Depot level CPAC work.  The 
last option, the status quo, which uses commercial 
transportation, has certain drawbacks which prevent it from 
being considered as a viable option at this time.  
2. Recommendation 
Implement a process which utilizes the overall Best 
Value to the Marine Corps. The Best Value is a combination 
of lowest cost and fastest return of equipment to the war 
fighter.  The analysis has shown that the local vendor 
option followed by utilizing organic transportation assets 
will meet this specific set of criteria.  While the bulk of 
this Depot level work will still need to be performed at 
MCLB Barstow, using Base Motors, vice civilian carriers, 
will greatly increase Readiness and decrease costs compared 
to the status quo.  Aside from these benefits, this system 
provides customer service in that Base Motors will come 
directly to the battalion, pick up the gear, and receipt 
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for it at that time.  There will also be one point of 
contact regarding transportation vice the numerous 
personnel now involved.      
D. WHAT CHALLENGES NEED TO BE OVERCOME TO SUCCESSFULLY 
ENSURE THE BEST VALUE REMAINS A PROGRAM GOAL? 
1. Conclusion 
The present program being used by IMEF has some 
challenges that need to be addressed.  The first challenge 
is the lack of daily oversight for the program as a whole.  
While there are a number of extremely dedicated and 
professional civilians and Marines working areas of the 
program, there appears to be a lack of total oversight.  No 
one single individual handles the total transportation 
process.  It was necessary for the researcher to contact 
Base Motors, TMO Camp Pendleton and MCLB Barstow to gather 
transportation data for this thesis.  For example, one C3 
representative at Camp Pendleton had the majority of data 
regarding MCLB Barstow, but the other representative had 
all the DES data.  It was difficult to decide who to 
contact for particular information as everyone concentrated 
on their own particular area of expertise exclusively. 
Even then, creating a coherent total picture of the 
transportation process was difficult at best.  Though the 
C3 program at Barstow is a model of efficiency, even that 
operation had two vehicles in their lot that had been 
waiting 16 days to be returned to Camp Pendleton.  Whether 
these vehicles were undergoing the C3 process, or awaiting 
transportation, the assets were still out of the control of 





Greater emphasis should be placed on meeting the needs 
of the customer, the battalion/squadron Commanders.  Their 
needs are to get their assets back as soon as possible to 
ensure their ability to meet their individual missions.   
E. WHAT CHALLENGES NEED TO BE SOLVED BEFORE 
IMPLEMENTATION? 
1. Conclusion 
The first challenge is the inability to transfer the 
funds currently obligated to TMO for CPAC transportation, 
to Base Motors.  This should involve only those funds 
needed for CPAC transportation, and doing this would 
eliminate any necessity to use scarce O&M funds.   
The next challenge is to ensure there is a steady flow 
of equipment to the C3 program to eliminate any bottlenecks 
in the queue, which may cause a delay in entering the 
process.  Bottlenecks are the result of uneven flows of 
equipment during the fiscal year. 
2. Recommendation 
The challenge associated with diverting funds to the 
correct entity is something that can be solved by the IMEF 
comptroller, before the fact.  Prior fiscal year planning 
should alleviate any problems. 
The second challenge is already being worked by the 
Production Controller of the C3 Program at MCLB Barstow who 
indicated they were working that issue. However, it is 
important they take into consideration the needs of the 
Battalion Commanders.  To minimize Operational Tempo 
disruption, Commanders send assets during the periods they 
can best afford to be without their equipment.  This must 
take priority over a preconceived schedule at Barstow, 
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which requires communication and understanding on the part 
of both parties.  
F. TOPICS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The research indicated there are some additional areas 
of research, which may also make this requirement more 
efficient: 
The major challenge discovered in this research dealt 
with transportation cost and efficiency.  Since both Camp 
Pendleton and MCLB Barstow are located adjacent to major 
rail lines, this may well be the most efficient use of 
transportation.  
The outsourcing portion of this thesis dealt 
exclusively with a firm that provided service for a small 
portion of medium tactical vehicles for IMEF.  Are there 
other firms located in the immediate area that could 
fulfill these requirements?  Is it possible some categories 
of work could have “tiger teams” visiting the battalion 
area to perform this service, vice sending the assets away 
for work? 
Finally, the annual CPAC conference shows that private 
industry is moving toward a dehumidifying process vice the 
present methods being utilized.  The Marine Corps is in 
fact also interested in moving in that direction.  What are 
the costs and implications of this possibility?  How will 
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APPENDIX.  LIST OF ACRONYMS 
Ao Operational Availability 
 
CPAC Corrosion Prevention and Control Program 
C3 Corrosion, Coating and Control 
 
DES Drezek Environmental Striping System 
DLMP Depot-Level Maintenance Program 
 
FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation 
FMC Fully Mission Capable 
FSSG Force Service Support Group 
 
GAO General Accounting Office 
GME Garrison Mobil Equipment 
 
IMEF I Marine Expeditionary Force 
 
MCB Marine Corps Base 
MCLB Marine Corps Logistics Base 
MIMMS Maintenance Management Information Systems 
MISCO Maintenance Information Systems 
Coordination Office 
MOA Memorandum Of Agreement 
 
NMCM Not Mission Capable Maintenance 
NMCS Not Mission Capable Supply 
 
SORTS Status Of Resources and Training Systems 
 
T/E Table Of Equipment 
TMO Transportation Management Office 
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